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Abstract 
 
Consumers increasingly demand multiple-quality attributes in food products and value 
reliable means to identify them. For producers, the effective communication of their products 
quality is a marketing strategy. Therefore, another market of information associated with the 
new food markets emerges. This market is closely linked to the institutional environment and 
the level of trust in different information sources. In this article the emphasis will be put on 
how the different quality signals provided by the firms in their products affect the consumers´ 
behavior. The objective is to investigate domestic consumers' perceptions and beliefs about 
food quality information in Argentina to identify the mechanisms that fully guarantee this 
quality.  
The results indicate that domestic consumers´ perceptions about high quality 
products are more related to brand names than seals and certifications in labels. This has 
consequences upon the competitiveness of domestic food market. Quality certification and 
seller’s reputation are quality warranties restrained only to certain domestic market niches. 
The household’s situation and occupational status seem to be more complex variables that 
resume the interaction between attitudes, information-processing and actions. 
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Quality Warranties and Food Products in Argentina.  
What do Consumers Believe in? 
 
Introduction 
 
International trade in high quality food products has expanded over the last decades 
as a consequence of the markets´ shift from homogeneous commodities towards 
differentiated products (Reardon et al., 2001). Consumers increasingly demand multiple-
quality attributes in food products, many of which cannot be observed either before or after 
purchase or consumption. Producers want to communicate their consumers about the quality 
of their products and to differentiate their goods from those of other producers. Consumer’s 
value reliable means to identify their desired products´ attributes. Therefore, another market 
of information emerges, associated with the new food markets. These food markets are 
characterized by information asymmetry and uncertainty on product quality (Antle, 2001).  
Credible mechanisms like private standards, labels, and certification systems are crucial for 
providing information to economic actors, allowing them to differentiate food products by the 
attributes that concern them. 
There is a large literature about the role of public regulation and private safety and 
quality standards (Henson and Reardon, 2005; Ippolito, 2003), third-party certifications 
(Deaton, 2004; Hatanaka et al, 2005) and grades and standards along the supply food 
chains (Hobbs et al, 2002; Berdegué et al., 2005). However, there are not enough empirical 
studies exploring the link between consumers´ trust and quality attributes warranties in 
developing countries. 
These countries are characterized by extremely heterogeneous situations. There is a 
large variation in the degree of modernization and external openness and thus exposure to 
“globalization” of their agrifood systems (Reardon et al., 2001). Large modern chains have 
emerged as dominant players in agrifood systems. These have actively promoted private 
grades and standards in order to be more responsive to their customer’s quality preferences 
and reduce costs by improving the quality of their inputs (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002). 
In this article the emphasis will be put on how the different quality signals provided by the 
firms in their products affect the consumers´ behavior. The objective is to investigate 
domestic consumers' perceptions and beliefs about food quality information in Argentina to 
identify the mechanisms that fully guarantee this quality.  
In the sections which follow, we present the conceptual framework for examining 
consumers´ attitudes towards certification and food quality information. Then, we describe 
our data and empirical methods and, finally, we present our results and their implications for 
policy and firm marketing strategies design.  
 
Conceptual framework 
 
Economic literature has characterized products´ attributes as search, experience, or 
credence, according to the way consumers obtain information about them. Search goods are 
those that can be assessed prior to purchase, via research and inspections (color, size). 
Experience goods are those whose attributes are evaluated by consumers after purchasing 
the products -e.g. convenience- (Nelson, 1970). Credence goods have attributes that 
consumers cannot evaluate even in use -e.g. organic goods- (Darby and Karni, 1973).  
Search and experience goods provide endogenous incentives for producers to 
maintain quality standards since a reduction in them leads, in the first case, to an immediate 
fall in sales or to the growth of a bad reputation, in the second case. In the case of 
experience goods, there would be a clear rationale for investment in quality control 
technology and in “brand-name capital”, because even though consumers may not be able to 
discern quality before purchase, through experience consumers learn which firms produce 
higher quality products (Antle, 2001).  
The existence of a market for credence or “trust” goods is either made possible by the 
reputation of the seller, or is subject to a quality guaranteed by a third party, often in the form 
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of a regulation which provides consumers with a substitute for the information and trust they 
lack (Tirole, 1988). Quality signaling through product labeling and information disclosure 
requirements encourages market incentives (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). By identifying 
its products with a quality control process, a firm may be able to convey product quality 
information to consumers. In this case, quality control may play a role similar to the role of 
brand-name.  
If it is possible to devise regulatory interventions that would effectively transform 
credence goods into experience goods, then product information disseminations, 
performance standards, product quality reputation and liability have the potential to lead to 
more efficient outcomes in food markets (Antle, 2001).  
Labeling decisions may enhance economic efficiency by helping consumers to target 
expenditures towards the products they want most. Thus, in their drive to persuade the 
maximum number of consumers to purchase their products, firms may provide the labeling 
information. The value of this service depends on the importance consumers attach to the 
product´s attributes and the difficulty they face in assessing the attributes on their own. The 
mere existence of these labels and certifications is not enough condition to guarantee 
efficiency. In other words, under imperfect credibility, the consumers´ choice will depend not 
only on the product´s price –with or without quality attributes- and the marginal utility derived 
from the attributes, but also on their trust in the information sources (Cho and Hooker, 2002).  
This assumes that consumers´choices of differentiated products through labels, 
depend on the level of trust the individuals have on the producers and the public or private 
control systems. The institutional environment affects the legitimacy of any external 
certification (Mainville et al, 2005). In many developing countries, food quality standards are 
often not strictly enforced by public authorities. However, retail and processing firms have 
incentives to create private standards and certification systems in order to increase their 
reputation. If the firm that promulgates the differentiating standard has a very strong brand 
name which manages to link to the standard, higher profits can be captured. Building trust 
and reputation around the visible symbol of a brand name and label make grade and 
standards systems credible to consumers (Northen and Henson, 1999).  
Recently, Huffman et al. (2004) argue that “understanding the formation of trust in 
information sources is an important step in understanding consumers´preferences for 
information on new products”. They provide new econometric evidence that consumers´ 
social and individual capital affect significantly their trust in different sources of information on 
genetic modification.   
Questions relating to whom consumers trust to make certifications for food quality and 
other assurances are important marketing issues.  
 
The Survey and Data 
 
We used a random sample of 304 consumers in the city of Mar del Plata at 20041. 
The data in this survey was collected from different points of purchase located in 
neighbourhoods selected by income level.  The level of demographic variables in the sample 
matches the population ones.  
The questionnaire inquired about individual´s education, age, occupation, household 
situation, and his / her beliefs in relation with food products quality, control systems and 
Argentinean institutions. Table 1 presents the sample characteristics and the frequency of 
responses to each category of the selected variables. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Although the conclusions cannot be extended to the whole domestic market, other studies show that 
Mar del Plata residents´ consumption behaviour don’t differ significantly from that of residents in the 
main urban regions of Argentina (Berges et al.,1998).  
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Table 1. Sample characteristics (N=304) 
 
 Number Percentage 
“Quality warranty consumers most trust”   
- Brand-name 215 70.7 
- Seller’s reputation 45 14.8 
- Quality certification 44 14.5 
 
Variables Description Number Percentage 
Single adults (HS1) 50 16.4 
Adults without kids (HS2) 114 37.5 Household Situation (HS) 
Adults with kids (HS3) 140 46.1 
Primary school complete (E1) 86 28.3 
Secondary school complete (E2) 159 52.3 Education Level (E) 
University level complete (E3) 59 19.4 
Retired people (OS1) 41 13.5 
Housewives, students, 
unemployed people (OS2) 
78 25.7 
Employees (OS3) 114 37.5 
Shopkeepers (OS4) 47 15.5 
 
Occupational Status (OS) 
Professionals (OS5) 24 7.9 
Female (F) 199 65.5 Gender Male 105 35.5 
Below the age of 25 (A1) 74 24.3 
Aged 26-45 (A2) 90 29.6 
Aged 46-65 (A3) 88 28.9 Age 
Older than 65 (A4) 52 17.1 
Indifferent people (QCS0) 92 30.3 
Public System (QCS1) 135 44.4 Quality Control System Preferences (QCS) Private System (QCS2) 77 25.3 
Low-income (Z1) 70 23.0 
Middle-low income (Z2) 82 27.0 
Middle-high income (Z3) 71 23.4 Zones (Z) 
High- income (Z4) 81 26.6 
Health priority If consumers are first concerned about health when buying food  
136 44.7 
Price priority If consumers are first concerned about food price when buying 
42 13.8 
Trust Institutions If consumers trust Argentinean Institutions and organizations 
255 83.9 
Quality informed If consumers are concerned at being informed about quality  
208 68.4 
 
Survey results also show that about 57.9 percent of consumers read food labels. This 
percentage differs significantly from 80-88 percent mentioned in other studies for developed 
countries (Nayga, 1999). This suggests that domestic consumers´ benefits derived from the 
information displayed in labels are not enough to compensate the additional time and 
cognitive cost incurred. 
 
Econometric Model   
The consumer’s utility of choice j is given by xij, which includes specific characteristics of the 
individual as well as the choices (Greene, 1993; Huffman et al, 2004).  
´ij ij ijU xβ ε= +                                              (1) 
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The utility of consumer i is based on the quality warranty choice j∈J. If he/she chooses j, it 
must be the choice yielding the highest utility. If disturbance terms are independently and 
identically distributed as a Weibull distribution, the probability of consumer i choosing 
warranty j is: 
´
1
j i
k i
´ x
i J
x
k
eProb(Y = j)=
e
β
β
=
∑
                               (2) 
This is the multinomial logit model. To solve the model we must define * j j qβ β= +  for any 
non zero vector q, and then normalize 0 0β = -because the alternatives are mutually exclusive 
and probabilities sum to 1-. The probabilities are: 
´
1
1
j i
k i
´ x
i J
x
k
eProb(Y = j)=
e
β
β
=
+ ∑
 for j =1,2,...,J    
´
1
1 k i
i J
x
k
1Prob(Y = 0)=
eβ
=
+ ∑
         (3) 
We can represent the probability of a consumer preferring warranty j as the log-odds ratios: 
0ln( / ) ´ij i j iP P xβ=                                        (4) 
This equation shows the probability that a consumer prefers (trust) warranty j over the 
reference choice 0. If ´ jβ  is positive, then a marginal increase in xi increases the odds that 
the consumer prefers warranty j over the reference one, which in this case is quality 
certifications. The regressors are variables proxing consumers´ beliefs, social status and 
individual characteristics. 
 
Empirical Results 
The fitted multinomial logit model provides empirical evidence for the odd ratios that a 
consumer trusts in brand names or seller’s reputation more or less than he/she trusts in 
certifications to guarantee quality in food products. The econometric results are presented in 
Table 2.  
Although some of the explanatory variables in the estimation are not statically 
significant at 5-10% level, they are not excluded from the model. “Keeping them in the model 
may help reduce bias in estimated effects of other predictors and may make it possible to 
compare results with other studies where the effect is significant (perhaps because of a large 
sample size) (Agresti, 2002, pp 214)”. 
Consumers´ education is associated with the ability to acquire and process 
information to make decisions. Hence, it would be expected that higher educated people are 
more likely to trust in certification which is a more complex mechanism of guarantying quality. 
But, this variable is not significant in our estimations and the odds show little evidence in the 
opposite direction; higher education is associated with higher values for brands and 
reputation.  
Age is a proxy for years of experience as a decision maker, which is expected to 
affect the formation of trust, and also an indicator of expected length of remaining life. As an 
individual becomes older he/she has fewer expected years over which to obtain benefits from 
acquired information (Huffman et al, 2004).  Younger people could be less worried about 
being informed about food quality because the consciousness about food safety increases 
with the age and the individual’s experience. 
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Table 2 . Multinomial Logit Estimates 
 
Brand-name/ Certification Seller’s reputation / Certification
Variables β Sig Odd 
ratios 
β Sig. Odd ratios
HS1 -1.716*** 0.008 0.180 -1.194* 0.107 0.303 Household 
Situation 
HS2 -1.496*** 0.009 0.224 -1.694** 0.016 0.184 
E1 -0.770 0.310 0.463 -0.463 0.612 0.629 
Education 
E2 -0.278 0.672 0.672 -0.365 0.644 0.694 
OS1 2.172** 0.049 8.774 1.512 0.367 4.534 
OS2 1.633* 0.070 5.121 2.464* 0.083 11.750 
OS3 2.720*** 0.001 15.186 3.771*** 0.004 43.426 
Occupational 
Status 
OS4 1.967** 0.022 7.147 3.167** 0.020 23.727 
Gender F -0.774 0.150 0.461 -0.942 0.137 0.390 
QCS0 0.929 0.123 2.532 1.197* 0.097 3.309 Quality 
Control 
System 
Preferences 
QCS1 -0.023 0.963 0.978 0.005 0.994 1.005 
Z1 -1.123* 0.089 0.325 -0.543 0.497 0.581 
Z2 -1.072* 0.094 0.342 -0.861 0.273 0.423 Zones 
Z3 -0.557 0.422 0.573 -0.085 0.917 0.919 
Health  -1.194*** 0.009 0.303 -0.655 0.249 0.519 
Price  0.986 0.402 2.681 2.232* 0.071 9.320 
Trust I  -1.259* 0.073 0.284 -1.260 0.122 0.284 
Q informed  -2.460*** 0.000 0.085 -1.686** 0.026 0.185 
A1 0.16 0.868 1.173 -0.973 0.387 0.378 
A2 -0.615 0.483 0.540 -1.533 0.139 0.216 Age 
A3 -0.325 0.668 0.723 -1.568* 0.096 0.208 
 
* Indicates that an estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
** At the 5% significance level.  
*** At the 1% level. 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig 
Intercept Only 
Final 
485.425 
389.522 
 
95.903 
 
42 
 
0.000 
Pseudo R-Square: Cox and Snell: 0.271  Nagelkerke: 0.338   McFadden: 0.195 
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Although only one of the odds is statistically significant at 10% (A3 in 
reputation/certification), the age effect is in the expected direction. Younger people trust 
more in brands relative to certifications and oldest people trust relatively more in reputation.  
Women, who are typical food shoppers and normally those who are most concerned with 
food issues and diets, are more likely to trust in certifications than men. This effect, however, 
is statistically weak. 
The proxy variable for income is the geographical zone where the survey was 
administered. Results show that higher income is best associated with brands and seller’s 
reputation. Only two odds are significant at 10% level, both from the lower income zones (Z1 
y Z2) and they indicate relatively less preference for brands.  
Occupational status and household situation are related to the opportunity cost of the 
individual’s time. The assumption here is that employed individuals have greater time 
pressures or higher opportunity cost of time (Nayga, 1999). For both estimations, 
brands/certifications and reputation/certifications, the “single adults” (HS1) or “adults without 
kids” (HS2) households are more likely to trust in certification quality relative to the reference 
category of the variable “adults with kids” (HS3). Therefore, the presence of kids in the 
household is positively related to quality food decisions based on brands or reputation. The 
odds for the variable occupational status show that all categories trust less in certification 
than professionals (OS5) –the reference category-. The employees (OS3) and shopkeepers 
(OS4) have higher odds, 43 and 23 respectively than professionals, of trusting in reputation 
relative to certifications. This finding reveals some evidence in the direction of “social capital” 
hypotheses that focuses on the importance of the individual’s surroundings and social 
networks to determine their preferences. People who are linked to commercial activities 
know more about their environment and they are likely to have higher levels of trust in 
reputation as a mechanism to guarantee confidence.  
Certain pro-active attitudes like being worried about healthy attributes in food or being 
informed about food quality may be closely connected with the individuals´ willingness to look 
for certifications in products´ labels. Likewise, people who declare to have confidence in their 
country institutions are more likely to trust the certification system.  
The variables “healthy”, “price”, “quality informed”, “trust institutions” and “quality 
control system” are related to consumers´ beliefs and habits. The odd ratios show the 
expected effects. People who are concerned with quality information and select the healthy 
attribute as first motivation to buy food have lower odds to trust brands and reputation 
relative to certifications.  People who select price, in turn, are more likely to trust in brands 
and, specially, in reputation. The confidence in the institutions indicates higher preferences 
for certification as quality warranty, even though there is no clear association with any 
specific type of system control. People who are indifferent to public or private systems have 
particularly higher odds to trust brands and reputation relative to certifications than people 
who clearly prefer a private control system. 
 
Finally, we can use the model to characterize the kind of consumers typically choosing 
brands, seller’s reputation or certifications: 
• If the consumer is a woman, who lives in Z2, trusts in institutions and prefers a public 
control system, works as an employee, lives with her husband and kids, is 45 years 
old (A2), has completed her secondary school level and is not worried about price, 
health or being quality informed, she will have a 0,93 probability of trusting brands to 
guarantee food quality. 
• If the consumer is a woman, who lives in Z3, trusts in institutions and is indifferent to 
public or private systems, is professional, lives with her husband, is 50 years old (A3) 
an is worried about health and quality information but not about prices, she will have 
a 0,76 probability of trusting certifications to guarantee food quality. 
• If the consumer is a man who lives in Z2, trusts in institutions and is indifferent to 
public or private systems, is a student, has 23 years old, lives alone and is worried 
about prices and quality information but not about health, he will have a 0,53 
probability of trusting seller’s reputation.   
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Conclusions 
 
Consumers´ perceptions about high quality products in Argentina are more related to 
brand names than seals and certifications in labels. This has consequences upon the 
competitiveness of domestic food market. Argentinean food industry has an heterogeneous 
degree of modernization. While large processors and retailers, especially multinational firms, 
have improved their products quality along the supply chain converging to international 
standards, small firms are very far from this quality level.  
Not all consumers are interested in improving their quality food information and they 
minimize costs by trusting brand names. Quality certification and seller’s reputation are 
quality warranties restrained only to certain domestic market niches. These mechanisms 
acceptance is related to the degree of information consumers have acquired and their level 
of trust in private firms, public authorities and the institutions. Building trust in brands, 
certifications and reputation as the best warranty for food quality is strongly associated to the 
environment in which consumers make decisions. The household’s situation and 
occupational status seem to be more complex variables that resume the interaction between 
attitudes, information-processing and actions. Social capital, proxied by consumers´ 
occupation appears to be more related to the way consumers choose food quality products 
than individual capital proxied by age or experience and education.  
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